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THE SCHOLARLY TRADITION REVISITED:
ALEXANDER BICKEL, HERBERT
WECHSLER, AND THE LEGITIMACY
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
William Haltom *
Mark Silverstein**
The greatness of a scholarly work cannot be measured simply
by the accolades it receives in contemporaneous reviews. The true
test is its power to shape debate among future generations of scholars; obsolescence in the academy is not the result of criticism but
rather of neglect. That a work continues to evoke comment years
after its publication is the highest form of scholarly commendation.
By this measure Herbert Wechsler's lecture, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law,I published in 1959, and Alexander
Bickel's 1962 book, The Least Dangerous Branch, surely rank as
two of the most important works in constitutional scholarship of
the last fifty years. In the wake of Legal Realism and amid waves of
vitriolic criticism of the Supreme Court, Professors Wechsler and
Bickel sought to redirect thinking about the !'ole of judicial review
in a democracy.2 They were the most prominent and successful of
those attempting to ground constitutional analysis on an understanding of democratic theory and institutional technique.
Our purpose in revisiting their jurisprudence is to offer some
empirical evidence about the validity of its underlying political assumptions. It will be helpful, especially to those who are not familiar with their writings, to begin with a brief summary of the theses.
I

Although they emphasized the significance of the written opinion, and particularly the courts' obligation to supply plausible, principled reasons for decisions, neither Wechsler nor Bickel believed in
•
••

Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Puget Sound.
Assistant Professor of Political Science, Boston University.
I. 73 Harv. L. Rev. I (1959).
2. See White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and
Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973).
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the myth of a mechanical jurisprudence. They understood that judicial decisionmaking often requires difficult choices among contending values and principles. Their goal was to reconcile the
inevitability of political choice with the demands of the judicial role.
To apostles of judicial abnegation, they replied that judicial review
is extremely valuable in a constitutional democracy. They believed
that the day-to-day compromises of democratic politics should be
balanced by an institution concerned with enduring principles. In
response to Judge Hand's negative view of the judiciary as an aristocratic anomaly barely sufferable in a democracy, they proclaimed a
positive role for judges as articulators of the ultimate values of the
citizenry. In their view, the necessity of giving good reasons for
decisions served not only to limit the independent will of the judiciary but also uplifted political debate and reminded citizens of their
own constitutional traditions. In response to those who viewed the
process of legal reasoning as a fa~ade for rule by robed aristocrats,
Wechsler and Bickel offered a vision of the judiciary educating a
politically aware and attentive citizenry on the meaning and relevance of lasting principles.
In short, Wechsler and Bickel aimed to resolve the Realists'
dichotomy between law and politics. Good law could be good politics. Judicial limitations, wisely employed, could be political resources because those limitations legitimized judicial choices and
distinguished them from the decisions of other political actors.
Although they are mistakenly characterized simply as proponents
of judicial restraint, both men eschewed a negative view of judicial
power in favor of an appreciation of the judiciary's potential to facilitate progressive reform while maintaining a profound sensitivity
to the tenuous nature of its claim to such a role. In a nation devoted to majority rule, they regarded popular consent as the foundation of judicial power.
At the outset, Professor Wechsler faced the task of distinguishing judicial decisionmaking from decisionmaking in the popularly
elected branches. Principles employed in politics, he noted, "are
largely instrumental ... in relation to results that a controlling sentiment demands at any given time."J In contrast to this,
the main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely
principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment
on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved.
To be sure, the courts decide, or should decide, only the cases they have before
them. But must they not decide on grounds of adequate neutrality and generality,
tested not only by the instant application but by others that the principles imply? Is
3.

Wechsler, supra note I, at 14.

SCHOLARLY TRADITION

1987]

27

it not the very essence of judicial method to insist upon attending to such other
cases, preferably those involving an opposing interest, in evaluating any principle
avowed?4

This standard, he believed, must govern both the Court's critics and
the Court itself; throughout the lecture, Wechsler derided "resultoriented" criticism as well as adjudication. Simply put, the
Wechsler thesis demanded a judiciary and a citizenry appreciative
of the significance of principle and generality in the law.
A neutral principle, according to Wechsler, is a legal reason
that a jurist is willing to apply beyond the circumstances of the case
at bar and without regard to the identity of the litigants.s Because
the opinion itself must attest to judicial competence, it should
clearly and unequivocally articulate the neutral principle that disposed of the case. Post facto rationalization via newly discovered
neutral principles does not fulfill the judicial obligation to supply
good reasons. By insisting that "the virtue or demerit of a judgment
turns ... entirely on the reasons that support it,"6 Wechsler sought
to shift judicial and public attention from the courts' results to their
reasoning. This was a critical step in the Wechsler thesis, for his
response to the Realist challenge was to devise (or revise) decisional
techniques that would command consent from lay observers.
Indeed, the central theme of Neutral Principles is that judicial
technique is required if the courts are to secure their title to decide
constitutional cases. 7 Hence the demands of a jurisprudence
grounded in neutrality are rigorous. Wechsler eschewed manipulation to achieve satisfying judgments. He reluctantly criticized the
Court for what he took to be its failure in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I) to provide neutral principles for a result Wechsler
applauded as politics but doubted he could defend as law. His willingness to confront the Court over an enlightened, redemptive decision gave his piece a measure of intellectual honesty that itself
4.

!d. at 15.

5. Wechsler did not, of course, deny that subsequent judgments of circumstances or
litigants' characteristics might modify the principle in particular cases. Nor would he hold
that judges may not notice extenuating or mitigating circumstances. Thus, critics who take
Wechsler merely to revive legal formalism are misreading him. Rather Wechsler is proposing
a mild version of Kant's categorical imperative or a practical operationalization of several of
Lon Fuller's desiderata (specifically, that legal rules be general, publicized, and reckonable).
See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-41, 46-51, 79-81 (1969). Wechsler is demanding
that jurists fend off ad hoc or "private" decisionmaking by undertaking to generalize rulings
and to systematize rules. For a perspicuous account of Wechsler's meaning, see Greenawalt,
The Enduring Significance of .Veurral Principles, 78 COLU~l. L. REV. 982 (1978).
6. 73 HARV. L. REV. at 19-20.
7. See H. WECHSLER, The Sature of Judicial Reasoning. in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY:
A SYMPOSIUM 290 (S. Hooked. 1964).
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reinforced the neutrality thesis.s
Wechsler's distinction between adjudication and politics
achieved the seemingly contradictory ends of providing a dynamic
conception of judicial review while at the same time constraining
the judicial will. Neutrality marked the limits of the legitimate use
of judicial power; yet at the same time Wechsler augmented judicial
power by "channeling" it within the bounds of neutrality. Once it
satisfied the neutrality requirement, a court was free to exercise
fearlessly the great power of judicial review.
By demanding that courts base decisions on reasons to which
impartial audiences might consent, Wechsler tried to reconcile judicial review with majority rule. Principled decisions could withstand
political criticism if courts and critics were compelled to reason
publicly and neutrally. A principled court earns public confidence
because its decisions are not based on personal whim and discretion.
This does not mean that idiosyncrasy and ideology are absolutely
eliminated from the judicial process; it does mean, however, that
the citizenry may be confident that the vagaries of personal will
have been reduced to the extent humanly possible. Technique, in
short, legitimates judicial review.
Wechsler insisted that neutrality was necessary at each stage of
the adjudicatory process lest obvious exercises of discretion undermine the Court's authority. He extended this standard even to the
control the Court exercised over its docket, observing that "much
would be gained if the governing statutes could be revised to play a
larger part in the delineation of the causes that make rightful call
upon the time and energy of the Supreme Court."9 Indeed, he suggested that the absence of discretionary jurisdiction during the
Marshall era protected that Court from charges of arbitrariness. 10
In the Wechslerian scheme, the only powers safely exercised by the
courts are those defensible in public by judicial reasons based on
neutral principles.
8. Unfortunately it also encouraged a misunderstanding of his central point. Wechsler
found deviations from the "separate but equal" rule unobjectionable if neutral principles supported a reexamination of the original reasoning of the Court. Thus Miller and Scheflin err in
claiming that Wechsler represented a resurrection of mechanical jurisprudence or a call for
strict adherence to precedent. Miller & Scheftin, The Power of the Supreme Court in the Age
of the Positive State, 1967 DUKE L.J. 273. Within the Wechsler thesis, doctrinal change is
always possible as long as neutral and general reasons are provided to support the new rule.
Furthermore, Professor Wechsler was not writing the brief for extreme judicial deference to
either the other branches of government or public opinion. As Greenawalt has noted. supra
note 5, at 993, Wechsler was quite prepared to defend the duty and power of the Court to
proceed without popular consent and in the face of resistance ({the Court could construct a
judicial justification for so doing.
9. Wechsler, supra note I, at 10.
10. /d.
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If Wechsler anathematized judicial discretion, Bickel very
nearly canonized it. Bickel shared with Wechsler the belief that the
judiciary is the institution best equipped to articulate and apply the
fundamental principles of American government. Furthermore, he
agreed that judicial review must be a principled exercise. Where the
two differed was over what Bickel termed "expediency." Wechsler
allowed no leeway for the courts to avoid the demands of principle;
to do so would seriously compromise the legitimacy of judicial review. Professor Bickel, however, feared that unrelenting devotion
to principle would place the judiciary on a collision course with
political reality. He encouraged the Justices to use pragmatic and
prudent discretion in deciding whether to hear a case or reach a
constitutional issue. Such decisions, he urged, should be grounded
on expediency:
The essentially important fact, so often missed, is that the Court wields a threefold
power. It may strike down legislation as inconsistent with principle. It may validate ... legislation as consistent with principle. Or it may do neither. It may do
neither, and therein lies the secret of its ability to maintain itself in the tension
between principle and expediency.' I

When cases were not appropriate for principled disposition, or
when principles would lead to decisions that would be ignored or
attacked, Bickel urged the expedient use of what he termed the
"techniques of avoidance."
Bickel thus neatly merged the Realists' belief that politics motivates judicial decisions with the traditionalists' norm that politics
should never affect the process of adjudication. He embraced both
sides of the debate by insisting that the Justices blend politics with
law and balance principle with expediency. As the means of accomplishing this feat of judicial statesmanship, Bickel proposed "the
passive virtues." These were tools by which the Court could exercise the third, neglected option-the option of doing nothing. Expedient use of the standing requirement, mootness, abstention, or
even simply denial of certiorari enabled the Court to pursue a
"mediating way" between legitimation and invalidation. The passive virtues provided a tactical escape from the Hobson's choice of
invalidating legislation on principles considered unacceptable by the
populace or abandoning principle to the transient will of the people.
Armed with the passive virtues, a principled Court could also be a
political Court.
Moreover, creative use of the techniques of avoidance might
strengthen the democratic process. By dismissing cases with appropriate hints to the majoritarian institutions, the Justices could stir
II.

A.

BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH

69 (1962) (emphasis in original).
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debate within the community, leading the politicians to rectify the
problem. In this way, the Court could minimize meddling in the
democratic process while husbanding its authority for cases where
intervention in defense of principle was unavoidable. Even when
the representative branches failed to respond or acted irresponsibly,
the debate might generate conclusions that the Court could then
legitimate. At the very least, this "continuing colloquy with the
political institutions and with society at large"I2 would be far more
compatible with the demands of democracy than a countermajoritarian Court unleashing thunderbolts of principle from on
high.
II

The contentions of Wechsler and Bickel have been evaluated
thoroughly from jurisprudential perspectives.I3 Little has been
said, however, about the validity of their empirical assumptions
concerning the effect of "bad" decisions on public attitudes toward
the Court. Is it true, as they suggested, that "neutral principles"
and "passive virtues" make controversial decisions more acceptable
to the public?
There are grounds for suspecting that neutral principles have
little or nothing to do with public reactions to the Court's decisions.
For example, congressional attempts to punish the Court for unwelcome decisions are often unrelated to whether the decisions were
principled and cogently justified in the opinions.I4 Social scientists
have demonstrated the obvious fact that most citizens lack the minimal prerequisities for thoughtful assessment of judicial opinions. Is
Even among sophisticated observers, result-oriented appraisals are
far more common than Wechsler acknowledged.I6
If we turn from Wechsler to Bickel, we again find grounds for
/d. at 240.
E.g., Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections
Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169 (1968); Greenawalt, supra note 5;
Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues, •:_A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. I (1964); Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661 (1960); Miller & Scheftin, supra
note 8; White, supra note 2.
14. C. LYTLE, THE WARREN COURT AND ITS CRITICS 29-49 (1968); W. MURPHY,
12.
13.

CONGRESS AND THE COURT 127-241 (1962).
15. Murphy & Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the United States Supreme Court, in
FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH (1969); W. MURPHY, J. TANENHAUS & D. KASTNER,
PUBLIC EVALUATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS: ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
(1973).
16. See Dolbeare & Hammond, The Political Party Basis of Attitudes Toward the
Supreme Court, 32 PuB. OPINION Q. 16 (1968); Nagel & Erikson, Editorial Reaction to
Supreme Court Decisions on Church and State, 30 PuB. OPINION Q. 647 (1966-1967).
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doubting key, empirical assumptions. For the passive virtues to
perform the mediating function that Bickel assigns to them, two of
his assumptions must be valid: (1) that lay publics can differentiate
decisions on the merits from decisions not to hear or not to decide
on the merits of a constitutional claim; and (2) that the public will
accept, with no political cost to the Court, the avoidance of substantive, principled conclusions to cases.
Professor Gerald Gunther has stated the case against the first
assumption:
It is true, of course, that rulings of "nonunconstitutionality" are often viewed
as approvals of the legislative policy. But that, as Bickel recognizes, is the result of
popular misinterpretation of the Court's actions ....
. . . If, despite the Court's reminders that failure to invalidate a law is not
approval of its wisdom, mistaken impressions persist, can we really expect to be
substantially better off if the Court "stays its hand, and makes clear that it is staying
its hand and not legitimating?" A Court "staying its hand" is, after all, failing to
invalidate; and a public so inattentive to the Court's reasons as to confuse wisdom
with constitutionality is not likely to perceive that "staying its hand" falls short of
"legitimation. "17

Is Bickel's assumption as unreasonable as Gunther asserts? Can the
attentive public distinguish between decisions on the merits and
those that avoid the merits?
And what about Bickel's other assumption? When the Justices
duck an alleged "duty to decide," do many observers object? Bickel
did anticipate that a number of observers might prefer to lose a substantive decision than to endure the uncertainties of a "judicial misfire."Is Was he wrong? Does the Court reap more opposition by
avoiding a decision than by reaching the merits with an unprincipled decision?
To examine the empirical basis for assumptions underlying the
theories of Professors Bickel and Wechsler, we studied the reactions
of editorialists for major American daily newspapers to several
landmark decisions of the Supreme Court.I9 First, we tested
Wechsler's assumption by examining editorial reactions to the three
decisions explicitly criticized in Neutral Principles: Brown I ;2o
Shelley v. Kraemer2I (invalidating racially-restrictive land cove17. Gunther. supra note 13, at 7 (footnote omitted).
18. A. BICKEL. supra note II, at 112-13.
19. For all cases from 1944 to 1955, editorials were sought from forty-three major
newspapers available on microfilm in Washington. D.C. This sample included five papers
with predominantly black readership and twenty-two dailies from cities that mandated segregated schools as of May 1954. For responses after I 969, we supplemented this original sample with data from Editorials on File. a service that collects editorials on major topics of the
day.
20. 34 7 U.S. 483 (I 954 ).
21. 334 U.S. I (1948).
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nants); and Smith v. Allwrighf22 (invalidating the white primary).
We found little evidence that neutrality and generality are necessary
for widespread acceptance by the editorialists of a constitutional deCISion. Then we considered editorials written in response to
DeFunis v. Odegaard,z3 a famous recent example of judicial avoidance. Reaction to this case illustrates the serious costs incurred
through the use of the passive virtues in cases where the public expects a decision on the merits. While these reactions do not wholly
invalidate the Bickel thesis, they do suggest that the efficacy of the
techniques of avoidance may be limited to less visible and less salient cases.
Editorialists provide an excellent audience for testing the political assumptions of Bickel and Wechsler. Because both men articulated ways to manage the "amorphous power of public
reaction"24 we must evaluate the political advisability of their techniques with reference to an audience. It would be foolish, however,
to focus on mass audiences, because ample research attests to the
inattention of the average citizen. Editorialists, in contrast, are
sophisticated enough to appreciate or deprecate the reasoning of the
Court while at the same time considering the political, social, and
cultural concerns of their readers. Disciplined by the demands of
their employers and their readers, editorialists' opinions are likely
to reflect the standards and capabilities of their most informed readers. Certainly the editorialists are likely to be more sophisticated
than most citizens, and thus we may interpret their responses as the
most we can expect from the citizenry at large; indeed, many citizens probably gain their opinions of the work of the Supreme Court
from the writings of editorialists. Finally, editorials-unlike theresponses of most other publics-are available without obtrusive surveying, and in a format fairly comparable from respondent to
respondent.
22. 321 u.s. 649 (1944).
23. 416 U.S. 312 (1974). In DeFunis, the petitioner, a white male, contended that he
had been unconstitutionally denied admission to the University of Washington Law School as
a result of the law school's affirmative action admissions program. A five-man majority of the
Court held the case moot because the petitioner, who had been attending the law school
during the pendency of the action as the result of a lower court order, would graduate from
the law school regardless of the outcome of the case. Justice Douglas was the only dissenter
who stated his view of the merits of the claim.
24. D. GREY, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NEWS MEDIA 3 (1968). Wechsler was
less explicit about this, but his goal of discovering standards of legal argument that would
guide and bind judges and their critics would only make "democratic" sense if those standards satisfied those who were not experts. Bickel clearly anticipated the efficacy of the passive virtues beyond lawyers and judges. Indeed, Gunther observed that if Bickel did not
intend the passive virtues to "work" on attentive lay observers, their function was unclear.
Gunther, supra note 13, at 7.
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If, indeed, neutral principles are a minimal prereqmstte for
legitimation of judicial decisions, we should expect editorialists to
bridle at decisions identified by Wechsler as deficient in neutrality
or generality. If editorialists failed to discern the absence of
principle or at least failed to object to the flaws cited by Wechsler,
then it is hard to maintain that neutral principles are actually necessary for public acceptance of decisions. Table 1 reveals that the
flaws in three landmark decisions that Wechsler singled out for criticism did not lead to greater disapproval among editorialists than
the opinions in two contemporaneous landmarks that Wechsler did
not criticize.25 In each of the five cases, a majority of the editorialists supported the decision of the Court. Although responses to
both Allwright and Brown I were somewhat less approving than the
responses to Sweatt v. Painter (which Wechsler did not single out
for criticism), the responses to Shelley (which Wechsler specifically
found wanting in neutrality) were roughly the same as those to
Sweatt. Surprisingly, the greatest percentage of approving editorials
greeted Brown I, a decision seldom cited as a paragon of neutrality.
Focusing on explicit approval alone actually understates the
difficulties with Wechsler's assumption. If neutral principles are politically essential rather than marginally helpful or occasionally advisable, then this sophisticated audience presumably would
explicitly disapprove of decisions that lack neutrality. If we take
the absence of explicit disapproval to betoken acquiescence, the row
percentages in Table 1 are damning evidence. Acquiescence (i.e,
approval and neutrality combined) overwhelms disapproval and
ambivalence combined by more than three to one in Allwright and
by more than four to one in Brown 1 In response to Shelley, twenty
out of twenty-one editorials available were either approving or
neutral.
Many of the editorialists may have so welcomed the results of
these cases that they were loath to be too critical of the Court's
reasoning. Needless to say, such acceptance does not bode well for
the Wechsler thesis because it suggests that substantive agreement
with the Court suffices to ensure popular approval of a decision.
25. In addition to the cases cited in notes 17-19, we examined editorials discussing
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) and Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), 349
U.S. 294 (1955). Both of these are racial discrimination cases that Wechsler did not expressly
criticize in his article.
Three coders judged the evaluation of the landmarks by each editorial. Editorials were
coded "approving" if they expressly lauded the decision of the Court and did not expressly
criticize the decision. Editorials that criticized without any express praise were coded "disapproving." If the editorial expressed both criticism and praise its was coded "ambivalent." If
no explicit evaluation was forthcoming, it was coded as "neutral." The judgment of two of
the three coders was sufficient to overrule the third coder.
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TABLE 1
Editorial Reactions to Selected Racial Justice Cases, by Region
DECISION

Smith v. Allwright

Shelley v. Kraemer

EDITORIAL
REACTION

Disapproval
Neutrality
Ambivalence
Approval
Disapproval
Neutrality
Ambivalence
Approval

Sweatt v. Painter

Disapproval
Neutrality
Ambivalence
Approval

Brown v. Bd. of Educ. I

Disapproval
Neutrality
Ambivalence
Approval

Brown v. Bd. of Educ. II

Disapproval
Neutrality
Ambivalence
Approval

REQIQ~S

"NORTH"

"SOUTH"

TOTAL

N

N

N

%

5
7

18
25
4
54
101
5
33
0
62
100
7
26
7
61
101
12
27
2
59
100

0
3
0

%

12

0
25
0
75
100

0
2
0
6
8
0
2
0
12
14

0
25
0
75
100
0
14
0
86
100

I

5
10
0
86
101
17

9

2
0
18
21
3
2
I

12
18

II

6
67
101

5
4
I

6
16
I

5
0
7
13

2
6
2
7
17
4
9
I

6
20
1
7
0
12
20

%

31
25
6
38
100
8
39
0
54
101
12
35
12
41
100
20
45
5
30
100
5
35
0
60

100

I

15
28
1
7
0
13

21
2
8
2
19
31
5
11
1
24
41
4
9

1
24
38

II

24
3
63
101

KEY:
"North" = Newspaper published in state that did not mandate segregation.
"South" = Newspaper published in state that mandated segregation in schools in May,

1954.
Neutrality = Editorial took no explicit stance on decision.
Ambivalence = Editorial explicitly approved and disapproved of decision.

Moreover, if we find that those editorialists with reason to condemn
the results of the three decisions were nevertheless disposed to accept them, then neutral principles will not have been necessary to
induce acceptance even among expected critics. Table 1 shows that
among editorialists for newspapers in states that mandated segregated schools there was far less opposition to the decisions than we
might expect. If, as above, we count as acquiescent all editorialists
who did not express disapproval of any aspect of the decision, every
decision expressly criticized by Wechsler elicited acquiescence from
at least sixty percent of the southern and border-state editorialists.
Given Wechsler's conclusion that these opinions lacked both neu-
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trality and generality, the fact that we get so little criticism of any
kind from this particular audience raises serious doubts about the
Wechsler thesis.
A brief review of the reasons that editorialists gave for their
reactions undermines Wechsler's contentions still further. In
response to Allwright, supporting editorials tended to emphasize the
justice of the holding while underemphasizing the opinion's reasoning.26 One would expect opponents of integrated primaries to point
to any presumed weaknesses in the Court's reasoning. Instead,
criticisms were almost entirely result-oriented.27 Editorial responses to Shelley v. Kraemer displayed a similar willingness to accept the Court's reasoning. Approving editorialists applauded the
common-sense realism of the Court; once again the moral rectitude
of the decision was central and the reasoning of the opinion peripheral.2s The only opponent of Shelley objected to the result and not
the reasoning.29
Wechsler made Brown I the prime example of lack of neutrality in judicial decisionmaking and one would expect the reaction to
Brown I to illustrate the wisdom of the Wechsler thesis. Only five
newspapers, however, explicitly opposed the decision; four of the
five attacked neither the reasoning nor the neutrality of the Court.Jo
Only the New Orleans Times Picayune argued with the logic of
Brown l3I Professor Wechsler's criticism notwithstanding, the
26. See. e.g., The Supreme Court Puts "Real Democracy" Up to the American People,
Cleveland Call and Post, April 15, 1944, at 8; Truth, Logic and Justice Win in Court, Louisville Courier J., April 5, 1944, at 6; A Victory for Democracy, St. Louis Post Dispatch, April
4. 1944, at 28; Political Equality Upheld, Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 4, 1944, at 6.
27. The Memphis Commercial Appeal found an absence of neutrality but not of the type
that concerned Wechsler: "The Court's decision is right down the alley of the New Deal and
in thorough consonance with the Communist-inspired policy of ruling through balancing
minorities." April 5, 1944, at 6. The Dallas Morning News disagreed with the Court's conclusion that political parties were agents of the state while admitting that the policies of the
state of Texas might have abetted that finding. April 5, 1944, § II, at 2. Only the Charleston
(S.C.) News and Courier even approximated Wechsler's concern. April 4, 1944, at I.
28. See, e.g., A New Emancipation Proclamation, Pittsburgh Courier, May 22, 1948, at
4; Equal Protection, Wash. Post, May 6, 1948, at A8; Restrictive Deed Given Highest Court
Kayo, Dallas Morning News, May 5, 1948, §IV, at 2; Voluntary Housing "Segregation"
Okayed, Atlanta Constitution, May 5, 1948, at 8; No Standing in Court, Wash. Star, May 4,
1948, at A8; An Equal Rights Victory, St. Louis Globe Democrat, May 4, 1948, at 2C.
29. Charlotte Observer, May 6, 1948, at 12A.
30. The Los Angeles Times described the practical problems entailed by the ruling but
allowed that the Court hardly could have reasoned otherwise on the legal issues. May 19,
1954, § II, at 4. The Atlanta Constitution was utterly result-oriented in deploring the decision
for the practical difficulties it raised. May 18, 1954, at 4. Both the Birmingham News, May
18, 1954, at 10, and the Charleston (S.C.) News and Courier, May 18, 1954, at I, preferred
separate but equal, but neither questioned the reasoning of the Court.
31. May 18, 1954, at 8.
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opinion in Brown I drew relatively little negative comment; it is
hard to see how "neutral principles" could have worked any better.
Evidence from the editorial reaction to these "flawed" opinions
does not, of course, rebut every aspect of Wechsler's advice to
judges.32 It does, however, suggest that the legitimacy of the Court
is hardly as precarious as Wechsler assumed. Certainly the evidence justifies a healthy skepticism about the proposition that neutral principles are necessary to ensure public acceptance of judicial
decisions. Before an audience of judges and lawyers, these decisions
might be condemned for their lack of neutral principles. By a sophisticated lay audience, however, the Court's efforts seem to be
appraised with essentially political criteria.
Bickel assumed that lay observers could distinguish judicial
avoidance from judicial disposition on the merits. He also assumed
that the avoidance of some decisions would generate more public
acceptance-or at least less public criticism-than disposition on
principled grounds. We test these assumptions below with reference to DeFunis v. Odegaard, a landmark of judicial avoidance. We
would prefer to test a variety of decisions employing the passive
virtues, but such cases rarely evoke editorial comment. Because
Bickel's argument would make little sense if he were counseling
avoidance of Il"inimally visible cases, we restrict ourselves to consideration of the impact of the techniques of avoidance in a highly
visible, much-awaited decision.
Gunther criticized Bickel for assuming that the public can distinguish decisions avoided from decisions on the merits. For the
mass public such skepticism may well be warranted. Bickel's position may be saved, however, by limiting his assumption to the abilities of relatively attentive and sophisticated laypersons such as
editorialists. Only one of the responses to the DeFunis decision that
we collected mistook it for a ruling on the merits.33 The evidence,
while hardly compelling, does suggest that the editorialists can
make the distinction so necessary for the Bickel thesis. 34
On the other hand, as Table 2 indicates, a plurality of editorialists explicitly disapproved of DeFunis. Contrary to what a reader of
32. See Greenawalt, supra note 5, for a discussion of the many virtues of the Wechsler
thesis.
33. Atlanta Daily World, April 26, 1974, at 4.
34. Moreover, Editorials on File, 1970-1984, contains ten sets of editorials on cases in
which the Supreme Court avoided determination on the merits (mainly denials of certiorari).
In eight of the ten instances, editorials correctly perceiving the action of the Court outnum·
bered those that did not by more than two to one. While there does seem to be some relation·
ship between the visibility of the litigation and the perception of avoidance, we conclude that
editorialists, for the most part, are capable of making the necessary distinctions.
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Bickel might suppose, opposition to DeFunis, in fact, exceeded opposition to the Bakke decision in which the Court first grappled
with the issue of constitutionality of affirmative action in admissions
to professional schools.3s Opposition to DeFunis exceeded that to
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,36 in which the Court upheld an affirmative action plan negotiated by a private employer and
a union against a challenge based on Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. From the figures set forth in Table 2, it is difficult to
see what the Court gained politically by mooting DeFunis, particularly in light of the fact that it hardly could be said that in the years
between DeFunis and Bakke the community reached a consensus on
the resolution of the affirmative action question. Only three newspapers in the sample explicitly endorsed the outcome in DeFunis;
ten times that many endorsed the results in Bakke and Weber.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 37 and Milliken
v. Bradley 3s are also included in Table 2 to provide further basis for
comparison.
TABLE 2
Editorial Reactions to Recent Racial Justice Decisions
Decision

NE

Explicit
Approval
32.5%

1971

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg

65

1974

DeFunis v. Odegaard

33

Inexplicit
Position

6.1

Explicit
Disapproval

50.8%

16.9%

42.4

51.5
30.6

1974

Milliken v. Bradley

36

52.8

16.7

1978

Regents v. Bakke

69

42.0

47.8

10.1

1979

Steelworkers v. Weber

45

66.7

4.4

28.9

KEY:
NE = Number of editorials that responded to ruling.

Disagreements with the Court's action in DeFunis were often
salty, as headlines from several critical editorials make clear:39
"DUCKING A DIFFICULT CASE"
"DODGING AN IMPORTANT ISSUE"
"SIDESTEPPING THE QUOTA ISSUE"
35. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
36. 443 u.s. 193 (1979).
37. 402 U.S. I (1971).
38. 433 u.s. 267 (1977).
39. Headlines respectively from Charleston (S.C.) News and Courier, April 27, 1974, at
lOA; Memphis Commercial Appeal, April26, 1974, at 4; Dallas News, April26, 1974, at 2D;
Milwaukee Sentinel, April26, 1974, at 18; Rocky Mountain News, April25, 1974, at 66; San
Francisco Chron., April25, 1974, at 38; Detroit News, April25, 1974, at lOB; St. Petersburg
Times, April 24, 1974, at 22A.
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"THE SUPREME COURT DUCKS"
"MISSED OPPORTUNITY"
"HIGH COURT DUCKS"
"THE COURT DODGES A CASE OF BIAS"
"A NEEDLESS DELAY"

These headlines reveal the dismay of many editorialists that a
much-anticipated articulation of constitutional standards was not
forthcoming. Needless to say, this reaction undermines Bickel's assumption that the passive virtues bolster the Court's legitimacy.
Although evasion in DeFunis was costly, the cost of avoidance
may have been less than the cost of decision. To shed some light on
this intriguing problem, we cross-tabulated responses to DeFunis
with reponses to Bakke and Weber. In response to both of the decisions on the merits, at least half of the critics of DeFunis expressed
approval of the rulings. Seven of the nine editorialists who took no
position on DeFunis explicitly endorsed Weber. Of the 12 newspapers coded as inexplicit on the DeFunis case, four explicitly approved the disposition in Bakke and none disagreed explicitly.
Thus DeFunis elicited disapproval from newspapers that, as best we
can surmise, would have approved of-or at least acquiesced in-a
decision on the merits.
What is perhaps most striking about the editorialists' reactions
to DeFunis is that it was not the specific use of the mootness doctrine that provoked criticism but rather the avoidance of the decision per se. That is, most criticism of DeFunis was not based on a
perception that this was a particularly inept use of the passive virtues. Table 4 allows us to compare the two major reasons the
editorialists gave for their reactions to DeFunis.#J Acquiescence
and opposition to the decision are cross-tabulated with evaluations
of ( 1) the specific use of the mootness doctrine in DeFunis, and
(2) the duty of the Court to decide important constitutional issues.
Less than half of the disapproving editorialists name the misuse of
mootness as cause for disapproval while all of these editorialists
cited the unacceptability of avoidance. Of the editorialists who acqiesced in the decision, five were moved to lament the absence of a
decision on the merits.
40. Table 3 dichotomizes the variables for interpretive convenience. Hence editorialists
are divided into explicit opposition (to the holding, to the use of mootness, or to avoidance)
and "non-opposition" (explicit approval or inexplicitness). We tabulate in this way because
the success of Bickel's passive virtues, in our judgment, requires only that the Court secure
acquiescence. The Court does not need the outright, expressed approval of its publics for the
hypothesized legitimation to occur. Silence is sufficient and thus in Table 3 we treat silence as
assent.
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TABLE 3
Editorial Evaluations of DeFunis v. Odegaard Cross-Tabulated
with Evaluations of Regents v. Bakke and Steelworkers v. Weber
Explicit
Disapproval

Inexplicit
Position

Explicit
Approval

Total

BAKKE

0

0

Inexplicit Position

4

8

0

12

Explicit Approval
Total

5
10

4
12

2
2

II

Explicit Disapproval

24

WEBER

4

Explicit Disapproval

2

Inexplicit Position

0

Explicit Approval
Total

4

7

I

6

9

2

0

12
17

TABLE 4
Explicit Grounds for Opposition and Acquiescence in DeFunis
EDITORIAL STANCE ON DEFUNIS
Opposition

Acquiescence

This Use of Mootness Incorrect

8

0

This Use of Mootness Correct

9

16

''Nondecision'' Unacceptable

17

4

0

12

"Nondecision" Acceptable
KEY:

Opposition = Explicit disagreement with Court's ruling.
Acquiescence = Explicit agreement with Court's ruling or inexplicit position.
This Use of Mootness Incorrect = Explicit statement that DeFunis was not technically
moot.
This Use of Mootness Correct = No explicit statement concerning the technical
mootness of DeFunis or explicit statement that DeFunis was moot.
"Nondecision" Unacceptable
affirmative action issue.

=

Explicit opposition to postponement of decision on

"Nondecision" Acceptable = No explicit opposition to postponement of decision on
affirmative action issue, or explicit approval of postponement.

The data point to the conclusion that avoidance is a political
problem for the Court. Indeed, it is a problem of sufficient magni-
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tude that one wonders whether the cost of avoidance in highly
visible cases exceeds the cost of an unpopular decision on the merits. At the very least these data may suggest that an important,
sophisticated, segment of the lay public lacks the patience so necessary to Bickel's theory of judicial review.

III
The controversy over the legitimacy of judicial review in a constitutional democracy has been characterized as the "central problem of contemporary constitutional theory."4t There is, perhaps,
no more fitting tribute to the enduring influence of Bickel and
Wechsler than the accuracy of this statement. Without question,
they were among the most eloquent and persuasive of those who
considered the examination of the "counter-majoritarian difficulty"42 to be the essential task of constitutional scholars. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, they recognized the question
of legitimacy to be one of practical politics as well as democratic
theory. Regardless of the intent of the framers or the demands of
the separation of powers, Bickel and Wechsler understood that in
the final analysis judicial review is dependent on the will of the
citizenry.
The effort to reconcile the tension between judicial review and
majority rule in terms of both practical politics and democratic theory led Wechsler and Bickel to an emphasis on judicial technique
and the role of principle. If judicial decisions could be shown to be
based on desirable qualities normally absent from democratic politics, then judicial review was defensible despite its undemocratic
character. Furthermore, adherence to certain techniques, be they of
avoidance or neutrality, would facilitate public acceptance of judicial actions. In short, principle and technique, properly employed,
would result in a powerful and politically acceptable Supreme
Court.
In joining practical politics with democratic theory, Bickel and
Wechsler defined the boundaries of normative constitutional scholarship for a generation of scholars. The data presented here are not
intended to disparage their work but rather to suggest the difficulties inherent in such an approach. Although legitimacy is a pri41. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (1982); see
also Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981); Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in Constitutional Adjudication: An Assessment and A Different Perspective, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 93
(1983).
42.

The phrase is Bickel's. See A. BICKEL, supra note II, at 16.
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mary topic in current normative constitutional scholarship, we
know strikingly little about how publics comprehend, or even learn
of judicial decisions.43 Focusing on the reactions of selected editorialists is an admittedly imperfect method of approaching the problem. Nevertheless, the data suggest that the techniques proposed by
Bickel and Wechsler are, at best, ineffectual and, at worst, actually
lessen public support of judicial action. Phrased in more general
terms, they suggest that the two dimensions of the legitimacy question-public acceptance and democratic theory-often work in opposite directions. This possibility did not appear to affect Bickel
and Wechsler and it certainly has not deterred those who followed
their lead. The result is that modern, normative constitutional
scholarship often consists of finely tuned, eloquently argued theories
of judicial review in which respected scholars simply assert that
their theory will result in enhanced legitimacy for the Court. Unfortunately, minimal attention has been directed to the question of
whether these assertions are grounded in anything firmer than the
faith of their authors.
Recently Professor Paul Mishkin has written in praise of the
Court's disposition of the Bakke case. 44 He did not attempt to defend Bakke in terms of principle; indeed, he acknowledged that the
outcome could not be justified by any notion of principle. Rather
he found the ambivalent posture of the Court "to be a wise and
politic resolution of an exceedingly difficult social problem."4s In
effect, the Court's "unprincipled" stance in Bakke recognized
deeply held beliefs on both sides of the issue and, as a result, diffused the intensity of the debate surrounding the issue of raceconscious affirmative action. One survey of editorialists suggests
that Mishkin is correct in his assessment of Bakke. 46 Bakke worked
because it appeared to provide a reasonable solution to a seemingly
intractable problem. Wechsler and Bickel, and their successors in
the tradition of normative constitutional scholarship, have failed to
provide coherent theories that account for the public success of decisions like Bakke. Until we do, the crucial link between public
consent and judicial power will remain obscured. As long as we
proceed to think and write about judicial legitimacy without
See, e.g. l. BERKSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND ITS PUBLICS (1978); C. JoHNB. CANON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT (1984).
44. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 907 (1983).
45. Id. at 929.
46. See W. HALTOM, VIRTUES PASSIVE AND ACTIVE: SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
AND THE ATTENTIVE PUBLIC (1985) (unpublished paper, American Political Science
43.

SON &

Association).

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

42

[Vol. 4:25

grounding theories in the attitudes and evaluations of the actual
audiences of the judges, legitimacy will remain "a symbol without
content that plugs a hole in an argument."47

47.

L. CARTER, CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING: THE SUPREME

CoURT AND THE ART OF POLITICS

56 (1985).

